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A Secure Memristor Replicator
Architecture with Physical Uncloneability
X. Yang, S. Khandelwal and A. Jabir
We present a lightweight and highly versatile architecture for
replicating the resistance of a source memristor into a destination
memristor. This can be useful for storing or backing up sensed
analogue information, e.g. sensed resistance, voltage, etc, in a
single memristor. The architecture, which is simple and power
efficient, is also able to produce non-linear digital codes during the
replication process for added security by taking advantage of the
non-linear behaviour of memristors. The generated codes can also
be used to retrieve the analogue value within acceptable conversion
errors, with circuit elements already built into the replicator. We
also show that the architecture demonstrates physical uncloneable
properties.
Introduction: A memristor is a non-volatile resistive memory
postulated by Leon Chua in 1971 [1] and fabricated by the HP
group in 2008 [2]. Since then, there has been significant interests in
exploiting this technology in the designs of high density non-volatile
memory, neuromorphic systems, logic design, and most recently in
sensors and solar cells [3, 5]. There are several existing techniques
for tuning a memristor’s conductivity to a predetermined value,
e.g. [3, 4]. Most of these techniques require complex circuitry, while
some require external processing and others are unable to perform
well for devices with high OFF- to ON-resistance ratios. To this
end, we propose an accurate and efficient lightweight architecture
for replicating the resistance of a source memristor into a destination
memristor by repeatedly applying programming pulses, but without
much of the drawbacks of the existing techniques. Such a circuit
can be crucial for backing up analogue data, e.g. from a memristor
sensor [5], before or during conversion to digital form. We show
that the proposed architecture is extremely versatile and can be
used not only for replicating memristors, but also for generating
non-linear digital code and decoding the code back to the source
memristance/voltage (within quantisation limits). Owing to this non-
linear encoding, the architecture also provides a certain level of
inherent security features. Our experimental results also demonstrate
that it offers physical uncloneability [6], which can be critical
in applications such as chip tagging/identification as well as for
preventing unauthorised fabrications.
Fabricated memristive devices are non-linear. Any change in the
tunnel barrier width exponentially changes its memristance. Let Roff
and Ron be the High and Low Resistive States respectively, l =
ln( RoffRon ), xon  x  xoff, where xon and xoff are the lower and upper
bounds of the undoped region. Then the instantaneous memristance,
RM = Ron  el (x xon)=(xoff xon), which is clearly non-linear in x [7].
Fig. 1(a) shows the symbol of a memristor. The state of a
memristor shifts non-linearly towards Roff when a write voltage VW
> a threshold voltage Voff is applied across it and it shifts non-
linearly towards Ron when VW < a threshold voltage Von is applied
across it [7]. The state of the memristor remains unchanged for
any voltage applied in between Von and Voff. Hence, the state of
a memristor can be read by applying a read-voltage, VR, such that
Von VR Voff and VR 6= 0.
Proposed Architecture: Fig. 1(b) shows our proposed architecture
for replicating a source memristor MS to a destination memristor
MD within quantisation limits. MS, MD and the load resistors, RSL
and RDL, form two voltage dividers. RSL and RDL are assumed to be
closely matched. The output of the voltage dividers VINS and VIND
are continually compared by the comparator.
1. Replication and Encoding: Let frep be the replication frequency
of the clock (clk) and Trep = Tprog +Thold = 1= frep be the clock cycle.
Voltages Vprog and Vhold are alternatively applied during Tprog and
Thold respectively. Vprog is adjusted to be sufficiently high so that VW
appears across MD only even with the load RDL. Similarly, Vhold is
adjusted to be sufficiently high such that a VR appears across both
MS and MD simultaneously. Hence resistance of MS is copied to MD
by repeatedly applying the programming pulses. During each Tprog,
Vprog shifts the barrier of MD from the Ron region towards the Roff
region by a small amount, but non-linearly, and during the following
Thold, MD and MS are compared. The counter at the top counts the
number of clock pulses required to replicate.
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Fig. 1: Proposed memristor replicator architecture.
The replication starts by first resetting the counter and a ‘CLR’
pulse applied to the negative (N) terminal of MD. This pulse is of
sufficient amplitude such that a very short duration resets MD to Ron.
The first stage of the counter is used to generate the pulse and once
CLR is complete the counter is reused for encoding. During CLR:
(i) the level-shifter is disabled with the strobe input; (ii) AND gates
A2 and A3 block the inputs and produce a constant zero. Hence, clk
is prevented from reaching the level shifter. As a result, the level-
shifter produces 0 at the P-terminal of MD and the high CLR pulse
at its N-terminal resets MD to Ron.
When CLR returns to 0, the level-shifter and the AND gates A2
and A3 are enabled and the replication starts. A2 passes clk to the
level-shifter which switches between Vprog and Vhold in the same
cycle (Trep). Vprog shifts the barrier of MD during Tprog, and the
resulting voltage is compared with that across MS during Thold by
the comparator. During Thold the comparator keeps producing a 1
until the voltage across MD exceeds MS. This forces A3 and A4 to
produce a 0, which lets A1 pass clk through to the level-shifter. As
a result the voltage across MD gradually increases during each clock
cycle, until it exceeds that across MS at which point the comparator
produces a 0 during Thold. This forces A3 and A4 to produce a 1 and
the level-shifter is disabled via the strobe. This stops A1 from letting
clk through thereby indicating an end of replication. Essentially the
circuit enters a ‘locked’ state which is controlled by the voltage
across MD. During replication, the counter counts the number of
clock cycles required to replicate, which is the encoded digital value
corresponding to the analogue voltage (resistance) of MS. Hence, the
proposed architecture performs non-linear encoding of the analogue
voltage/resistance while the replication takes place. It is assumed
that VINS remains steady during the conversion process. However, if
VINS increases during the conversion, then VIND will follow VINS. If
this is undesirable then adding a single latch between A4 and A1 will
ensure that the conversion stops the first time VIND matches VINS.
2. Decoding: Let us assume that while replicating, the counter
registered digital value C. Decoding is achieved by first clearing MD
with CLR and by ‘programming’ it with the same Vprog and Vhold at
the same frequency frep = 1=(Tprog +Thold) for C number of cycles.
A part of the decoder logic appears in the blue boundary in Fig. 1. A
down counter, initialised to C, is used to count the number of clock
cycles. After decoding, Vhold VDL, where VDL is the voltage drop
across RDL, divided by the current gives the corresponding encoded
resistance within quantisation limits.
3. Security and Physical Uncloneability: The proposed
architecture provides a certain level of inherent security by
virtue of non-linear encoding. The encoded value C is a function of
VW, Tprog, Thold, and MD itself. Hence, it is extremely challenging
to guess what resistance or voltage C represents without having full
knowledge of these quantities. Additionally, access to an almost
exact matching memristor to MD provides further challenge and
difficulty.
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The architecture also provides physical unclonability [6] by virtue
of non-linearity as well as its sensitivity to process and parametric
variations. As revealed by our experimental results, the non-linear
code depends heavily on the physical parameters of MD, e.g. the
physical length of a memristor D, threshold voltage, etc. Any small
variations in these are amplified by the counting based encoding
mechanism and results in different codes (Fig. 2). Hence, any two
fabricated chips are likely to produce different codes for the same
input voltage/resistance thereby making it very hard to clone.
While this architecture is geared towards replicating memristors,
it can also be used for non-linear encoding/decoding and for
Challenge-Response-Pair (CRP) based authentication [6]. Instead of
MS, in Fig. 1(b) VINS can be an input voltage serving as a challenge.
After encoding, the contents of the counter can serve as a unique
non-linear response. Additionally, this response will vary from chip-
to-chip owing to its physical uncloneability thereby also offering
provisions for chip identification/tagging. An analogue voltage at
VINS can be obtained from a lightweight encryption hardware or
a hash function generator, e.g. a linear feedback shift register, for
added security.
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Fig. 2: Variations in encoded digital output with 2% variation in
process parameter D for the same resistive values.
Experimental Results: For the experimental results, the memristors
were coded in Spice based on the model and parameters in [7]
and the systems were designed and simulated in LTSpice. We
used the 32 nm technology node for the MOS-transistors and
assumed Vprog= 41mV, Vhold= 20mV, Tprog= 2.5ns, RSL=RDL= 1KW,
Ron=1KW, Roff=100KW, D=3nm, Von= 0:2V and Voff=0.02V.
Table 1 summarises the results as MS was varied from 10KW to
90KW. Clearly, the encoded value is non-linear and maintains low
percentage error in copying the resistance of MS to the destination
MD.
The proposed architecture inherently provides non-linear
encoding as shown in Fig. 2. This figure also shows that a small
variation in the physical parameters of MD results in different
analogue-to-digital transfer characteristics.
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show the results of varying Vprog and Tprog
respectively while keeping the other parameters fixed. As we see
the behaviour of the proposed architecture is non-linear throughout,
i.e. it is non-linear for specific Vprog or Tprog and also for their
differences.
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Fig. 3: Effects of varying Vprog on the encoded values.
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Fig. 4: Effects of varying Tprog on the encoded values.
Table 1: Replication/Encoding (Ron = 1KW, Roff = 100KW).
Vprog=41mV,Vhold=20mV,Tprog = 2:5ns,RSL = RDL = 1KW
MS KW MD KW Time msec % Err Enc Val
10 10.0555 51.6685 0.555 10334
30 30.051 60.3387 0.170 12068
50 50.070 64.1536 0.140 12831
70 70.0653 66.6337 0.0933 13327
90 90.068 68.4787 0.0756 13696
Conclusions: We proposed a highly versatile architecture for
replicating a source memristor to a destination memristor, which
can also be used for generating non-linear digital codes for
added security, physical uncloneability, and also for decoding the
analogue value from the digital codes. The proposed architecture
is lightweight and relies only on a few logic components, two
comparators, and a counter. The simulation results demonstrated its
non-linear behaviour and its sensitivity to process and parametric
variations. The latter can be extremely useful for designing
physical uncloneable functions. We envisage that the proposed
architecture can be used for backing up analogue data (e.g. sensed
information [5]) especially in remote sensor nodes while securely
digitising the information, chip tagging/identification, as well as for
preventing unauthorised chip fabrications.
X. Yang, S. Khandelwal and A. Jabir (School of ECM, Oxford
Brookes University, UK)
E-mail: skhandelwal@brookes.ac.uk
References
1 Chua, L. O.: ‘Memristor-the missing circuit element’, IEEE Trans.
Circuit Theory, 1971, CT-18, (5), pp. 507-519
2 Strukov, D. B., Snider, G. S., Stewart, D. R. and Williams, R. S.: ‘The
missing memristor found’, Nature, 2008, 453, pp. 80-83
3 Olumodeji, O. A., Bramanti, A. P., and Gottardi, M.: ‘A memristor-
based pixel implementing light-to-resistance conversion’, Opt. Eng.,
2016, 55, (2), p. 020501
4 Olumodeji, O. A. and Gottardi, M.: ‘Emulating the physical
properties of HP memristor using an arduino and a digital
potentiometer’, 2016 12th Conference on Ph.D. Research in
Microelectronics and Electronics (PRIME), Lisbon, 2016, pp. 1-4.
5 Adedotun, A., Mathew, J., Jabir, A., Natale, C. D., Martinelli, E.
and Ottavi, M.: ‘Efficient Sensing Approaches for High-Density
Memristor Sensor Array,’ Journal of Computational Electronics,
2018, 17, (3), pp. 1285-1296
6 Vijayakumar, A. and Kundu, S.: ‘A novel modeling attack resistant
PUF design based on non-linear voltage transfer characteristics’,
Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition,
Grenoble, 2015, pp. 653-658
7 Kvatinsky, S., Ramadan, M., Friedman, E. G. and Kolodny, A.:
‘VTEAM: A General Model for Voltage-Controlled Memristors’,
IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems II: Express Briefs, 2015,
62, (8), pp. 786-790
2
